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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
Evidence from a range of surveys suggests that a large minority of the workforce would work a different number of weekly hours if it had a free choice and the hourly rate of pay stayed the same. The figures from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) used in this paper show that approximately 40% of individuals interviewed each year reply that they would like to adjust their hours, mostly in a downwards direction.
If these survey responses reflect genuine constraints on the labour supply behaviour of individuals there are several implications for labour market analysis. First, economists may have an inadequate understanding of how working hours are determined. Second, constraints on individual choice of hours may reduce overall welfare. The policy attention directed at initiatives in favour of 'work-life balance' in the UK suggests there are welfare considerations. Third, estimates of how responsive labour supply is to changes in the wage may be biased. Finally, supply-side policies aimed at changing the hours of constrained workers are unlikely to succeed.
I use data on the actual working hours and reported constraints of male manual workers from the first 9 waves of the BHPS to establish whether the hours of unconstrained individuals are determined differently from the hours of those who report being constrained. Put differently: do workers' reported constraints reveal anything about their labour supply behaviour? A negative response would cast doubt on the existence of constraints. I also look at how errors in the number of hours reported affect estimates of the reponsiveness (elasticity) of hours to the wage.
The evidence is that the determinants of working hours do differ for unconstrained and constrained individuals, lending credence to their subjective reports. A tentative finding is the state of the local labour market appears to affect the hours of constrained but not unconstrained workers. The results also point to large proportionate biases in the estimates of labour supply elasticities if constraints and measurement error are ignored. Nevertheless, all the estimates obtained are small, suggesting that the wage is not the main driver of hours worked.
Introduction
In the neo-classical labour supply model individuals face an exogenous wage rate and free choice of working hours. In this model, if a worker cannot choose the number of hours in the current job then competition amongst firms for labour ensures that he can find an alternative job matching his hours preferences. And yet evidence from a range of surveys suggests that a large minority of the workforce is in disequilibrium with respect to its choice of working hours. The surveys reviewed by Kahn and Lang (1996) If these survey responses reflect genuine restrictions on the labour supply behaviour of individuals there are several implications for labour market analysis.
First, the existence of constraints suggests economists have an inadequate understanding of how working hours are determined (though see the discussion of constraint models below). Second, constrained hours choices may imply substantial welfare losses. The policy attention directed at initiatives in favour of 'work-life balance' in the UK suggests there are welfare considerations. 5 Third, it is likely that 1 The questions generally made clear that the amount of pay received would change if hours changed (in particular, the Current Population Survey (CPS) of 1985 specified that the rate of pay would stay constant). 2 But note the sequence of the PSID questions is somewhat complicated and the phrasing does not always make clear whether the rate of pay would stay constant. Workers who may want to work less are told they would earn less money, whereas the question about wanting more work has no reference to pay.
labour supply elasticities estimated from conventional labour supply models are biased (see inter alia Biddle and Zarkin, 1989) . Fourth, as noted by Kahn and Lang (1991) , supply-side policies aimed at changing the labour supply of constrained workers are unlikely to succeed.
The aim of this paper is to use data on the actual working hours and reported constraints of individuals from the first 9 waves of the BHPS to establish whether the hours of unconstrained individuals are determined differently from the hours of those who report being constrained. Put differently: do workers' reported constraints reveal anything about their labour supply behaviour? A negative response would cast doubt on the existence of constraints.
To answer this question, after reviewing the various theories of hours constraints in Section 2, I describe a model of hours determination and reported constraints to be estimated by a two-step method (Section 3). It is a generalisation of the model estimated by Stewart and Swaffield (1995) on one wave of data. Section 4 describes a formal test, following Ham (1982) , of whether the unconstrained (desired) hours regime differs from the other regimes. I estimate the model in Section 5, applying an extension of the Heckman two-step selection correction method (described by Verbeek and Nijman, 1996) to panel data and ordered selection. The evidence is that unconstrained workers are in a distinct hours regime. In Section 6 I address a perennial concern of labour supply estimation, which is that the hourly wage is usually calculated by dividing earnings by reported hours: any measurement error in hours will impart a downward 'division bias' to the estimated wage coefficient due to the spurious correlation between the hours equation disturbance term and the wage measure. The availability of panel data enables the wage to be instrumented by its own lagged value (free of contemporaneous measurement error) to remove this bias. In Section 7 I find evidence in favour of the prediction of the model that demand side variables (in this case the local labour market unemployment-to-vacancy (U/V) ratio) affect the hours of constrained but not unconstrained manual men. Section 8 compares the calculated elasticities and implied biases which result from neglecting constraints and hours measurement error. Finally, Section 9 concludes.
Theories of hours constraints
Four main reasons have been advanced to explain hours constraints. First, if firms are monopsony buyers of labour then, under plausible assumptions, they will negotiate a bargain which is relatively favourable to the firm and involves higher hours and lower wages. Workers then work more hours than they would desire at the agreed wage rate (i.e. they are off their supply curves). Conversely, if workers have monopoly power (for example, through a union), it can be shown that bargaining can result in them working too few hours at the negotiated rate.
Second, constraints may be efficient responses to convexities in the production function (for example, due to start-up costs), as in the model of Card (1990) where workers face a lower bound on their weekly hours. More generally, these models predict that the hourly wage varies with the number of hours worked (Barzel, 1973 and Kinoshita, 1987) and that workers are only on their supply curves on flat portions of the wage-hours locus.
Third, in some models of long-term employment contracts, all workers are constrained in their choice of hours ex-post. This is because the contract specifies a wage which diverges from the worker's marginal product but, at the same time, efficiency requires that hours are fixed such that the marginal product equals the shadow wage. Thus the wage differs from the shadow wage and the worker is constrained.
Fourth and finally, in a dynamic matching view of the labour market the difference between actual and desired hours is one aspect of firm-worker match quality which should improve with labour market experience and mobility.
A model of hours determination

Hours regimes
Let the desired weekly hours of work, h it S , for individual i at time t be described by:
where x 1it is a vector of explanatory variables, including the hourly wage, with associated coefficient vector β 1 . Unobserved influences on desired hours are decomposed into an individual-specific, time-invariant (permanent) effect η 1i and a time-varying (transitory) effect ε 1it . This equation is the standard generic formulation for labour supply which assumes that individuals are free to choose their hours of work at a given wage rate. Individuals whose hours are described by (1) are said to be in the unconstrained hours regime. In the absence of hours restrictions, (1) can be estimated using data about the observed hours of the full sample of individuals to obtain estimates of the labour supply model coefficients β 1 .
To allow for the possibility that some individuals may be off their supply curves (as suggested by the responses to the BHPS question), define two additional equations describing respectively the number of hours, h it U , worked by an individual who would prefer to work more hours (the underemployment regime):
and the number of hours, h it O , worked by an individual who would prefer to work fewer hours (the overemployment regime):
The x jit vectors (j = 2, 3) contain explanatory variables, including the wage, associated with coefficient vectors β j . Unobserved influences on hours are captured by the permanent disturbance term η ji and the transitory disturbance term ε jit . The vectors x jit contain not only the supply characteristics x 1it but also those demand characteristics which are hypothesised to influence the hours of constrained individuals, implying testable restrictions on variables which are included in (2) and (3) but omitted from
(1). For example, in a monopsony model of constraints, measures of labour market conditions belong in the constrained hours equations but not in the desired hours equation. Since there is no reason to suppose that the hours of the underemployed will be determined in the same way as the hours of overemployed individuals, the coefficients and unobservables may differ between (2) and (3). Furthermore, the unobservables may be correlated with each other, as well as with the error term in (1). 
Selection model
If, given their observable characteristics, individuals were equally likely to be found in the three constraint states then, using the sample responses about whether they are overemployed, underemployed or unconstrained, it would be a simple matter to estimate (1), (2) and (3) 
where d it * is the latent propensity to be more overemployed and less underemployed; 
s≠t, so that cross-time correlation is assumed to arise via the permanent effect α i . The selection model set out in (4) is random-effects ordered probit.
Let the variances of the error components η ji and ε jit (j = 1, 2, 3) be σ jη 2 and σ jε 2 respectively. Non-random selection into a regime occurs if the errors in the selection equation (4) are correlated with the errors in the corresponding hours equation (1)-(3). I therefore allow η ji and α i to be correlated, with covariance σ jηα , and similarly let the covariance between ε jit and ν it be σ jεν . Correlation between unobservables thus arises from two sources, the permanent effect and the transitory effect.
These correlations affect the consistency of estimators of β j . In the case of fixed effect (FE) estimation on the subsample of individuals from a particular regime, the time invariant effect η ji is removed in estimation and a sufficient condition for consistency is that σ jεν = 0, i.e. selection operates through the permanent effect only. If this condition holds, then FE estimation removes the selection bias without any further correction. This is the reason sample selection is considered less of a concern when using panel data (Vella, 1998) . In the hours constraint literature, Ball (1995) estimated a labour supply equation in first differences on a sample of unconstrained individuals, arguing that sample selection was thereby removed. However, if selection also operates through the transitory effects, i.e. σ jεν ≠ 0, then selectivity bias remains. In the case of the random effects (RE) estimator, the requirements for consistency are stronger. For example, one sufficient condition is that σ jηα = σ jεν = 0, i.e. selection does not operate through either channel.
As noted below in Section 3.3, there is some evidence against the assumption that hours are distributed normally conditional on observables and therefore that the distribution of errors in the model (1)- (4) is jointly normal. Nevertheless the assumption will be maintained for the moment in the interest of a fuller exposition of the correction procedure. Below, as a robustness check, I re-estimate the model under the weaker assumption that the desired hours equation errors η 1i and ε 1it are simply linearly related to the selection equation errors.
Estimating strategies
Unbiased estimates of β 1 , β 2 and β 3 can be obtained by estimating each hours equation (1)- (3) jointly with (4), subject to adequate identification as discussed below.
However, the likelihood function includes a double integral even after some simplification (Verbeek and Nijman, 1996) , making it computationally unattractive.
An alternative would be to place restrictions on the selection process. For example, the model of Stewart and Swaffield (1997) is a two-limit Tobit where the observed hours, h it , of constrained individuals form exogenous censoring points on the distribution of desired hours.
6 They estimated the model on cross-sectional data but it would be feasible to extend it to panel data. In this case:
Estimation of this model is feasible directly by maximum likelihood.
I adopt a second, more general approach, yielding consistent estimates, which is an extension of the two-step Heckman technique to ordered selection and panel data. It involves estimating the selection model (4) and using the estimates to generate regressors which are added to the hours equations (1)- (3) to capture the conditional expectations of the error terms. Apart from its generality, this method offers the advantage that, although it assumes normally distributed errors α i and ν it in the selection equation, the coefficient estimates of the hours equations (obtained by OLS)
are more robust to non-normality of the errors η ji and ε jit , j = 1, 2, 3. 7 Stewart and
Swaffield rejected the normality of hours in their model, remarking that this was "problematic" for their estimator. Moffitt (1999) also comments on the sensitivity of the Tobit estimator to non-normality.
A test of the hours constraint information
Assuming that the model of reported constraints (4) is correctly specified, then the coefficient estimates from the two stage procedure may be used to test whether individuals' hours are determined differently in the three constraint states. A common objection to the use of subjective data in economic analysis is that survey responses are highly dependent how the questions are asked and thus are not very informative of the underlying process of interest. Reports of overemployment, for 6 Stewart and Swaffield (1995) , testing down from a more general model, could not reject the restrictions implicit in the Tobit model on their sample of BHPS wave 1 data. 7 Whilst there is evidence of a sharp spike in both actual and desired hours (Kahn and Lang, 1996) , it seems plausible that the difference between actual and desired hours (the variable underlying the selection model) approximates to a normal distribution.
example, may be positively correlated with long hours without reflecting any actual restrictions on the economic behaviour of these respondents.
The general scheme presented above suggests two tests of whether or not the constraints reported by individuals are associated with different hours determination regimes. The first is to compare the selectivity-corrected estimates of β 1 , β 2 and β 3 since under the null hypothesis that the determinants of hours are not regime specific, there should be no significant difference between the coefficient estimates. However, identification issues arise in estimating (2) and (3) (2) and (3), and identification would be on distributional assumptions alone.
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On the other hand, identification of (1) is achieved by the exclusion of demand variables. Thus the second test, originally proposed by Ham (1982) , is based on a comparison of two estimates of β 1 , the uncorrected estimates of (1) on the entire sample and the selectivity-corrected estimates from the unconstrained sample only.
Under the null hypothesis that reported constraints do not reflect different behaviour, the uncorrected estimator using the whole sample is efficient; under the alternative hypothesis that there are distinct hours regimes, the error term in (1) (estimated on the full sample) is augmented by h it O -h it S or h it U -h it S for constrained individuals. If this discrepancy between desired and actual hours is correlated with any of the determinants of desired hours x 1it (and evidence from the selection estimates reported below suggests it is), then the uncorrected estimator will be inconsistent. The selectivity-corrected estimates, on the other hand, are consistent under both the null and alternative hypotheses, assuming that (4) is an appropriate model of workers' reported constraints. A Hausman test can therefore be used to distinguish between the two hypotheses.
Two-step estimator with ordered selection and panel data
I propose a two-step method to test and correct for the ordered selection into the unconstrained regime, applying the techniques developed in the literature by Verbeek and Nijman (1996) and Vella and Verbeek (1999) . Analogously to the standard Heckman model, selection bias is eliminated by incorporating two additional selection-correction regressors into the main equation. They are derived as the expected values of the error components η 1i and ε 1it conditional on the vector of all outcomes d i . One can write:
Intuitively it is necessary to condition on the selection outcome in all periods because of the serial correlation in the selection model error
the contemporaneous value of the unobservable depends on its past and future realisations. Using assumptions made about the correlation structure of u it , η 1i and ε 1it , it can be shown that the expectations of the two error terms in (5) are: To evaluate (6) and (7) Verbeek and Nijman,1996) is:
generalised residual from the random effects ordered probit. The conditional density is then given by:
where l is has the form of the likelihood contribution in a cross-sectional ordered probit equation. Equation (9) is derived from the rules of conditional probability: intuitively one can see the similarity to g(v|w) = g(v,w)/∫g (u,w) du, where g(v,w) is the joint probability density of variables v and w, and g(v|w) is the density of v conditional on w.
These expressions were evaluated using the estimated value of γ from the selection equation. A potential complication comes in evaluating the two integrals.
Rather than Gausssian-Hermite quadrature, which is commonly employed in iterative procedures, I used a cubic spline algorithm (included in the Stata 7 software package).
Though more computationally expensive in that more integration points must be used for the same accuracy, this relative inefficiency is much less of a concern when the integral only has to be evaluated once for each individual. Sensitivity checks of the interval of integration and number of points showed that the differences were negligible over a wide range. The results presented use 50 integration points over the range of -5 to +5 of the normalised integral (i.e. substituting α i * = α i /σ α ∼ N(0, 1)).
Data and estimation
The selection model (4) was estimated on a sample of data from 9 waves from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). The constraint indicator is constructed from the answers to the question:
"Thinking about the hours you work, assuming that you would be paid the same amount per hour, would you prefer to work fewer hours, work more hours or continue the same hours?".
The wording of this question may lead to confusion amongst individuals who are not paid by the hour and so ideally estimation would be done on hourly paid workers only in the first instance. Unfortunately the BHPS did not carry a question on whether individuals were salaried or hourly paid until wave 9, and so a sample of manual workers (who should be less likely to be salaried) was used. The sample was restricted to men to avoid the complication of modelling workforce participation. A similar sample was used by Stewart and Swaffield in their analysis based on BHPS wave 1. The summary statistics of the sample are presented in Table 1 , with variable definitions listed in Table B1 , Appendix B.
[ Table 1 around here]
The sample consists of male manual employees aged 21-64 years who did not have second jobs and had valid observations on the variables of interest. Manual status is derived from information about socio-economic status (BHPS variable wJBSEG), summarised using 3 digit occupational codes. This level of occupational detail meant that I could drop men who were in manual occupations but likely to have had positions of responsibility (e.g. foremen) and thus less likely to have been hourly paid. A total of 5241 person-years were observed from the first 9 waves (1991-99) of the BHPS. This covered 1700 individuals observed on average over 3.1 waves. In about 55% of cases the men reported being unconstrained, whilst they were underemployed in 8% of cases and overemployed in 37% of cases. Table 1 shows that underemployed men worked on average about 4 fewer hours per week than unconstrained men who, in turn, did about 4 fewer hours than overemployed men. Moving from underemployed men through unconstrained men to the overemployed, we see a monotonic increase in mean age and tenure, and in the likelihood of being married, trade union covered and being paid partly by bonuses.
There is not, however, a substantial difference in log net weekly wage across the subgroups, but it is striking that unconstrained men had on average 32% higher weekly non-labour income than the overemployed (and 7% higher non-labour income than the underemployed). Comparing the mean values of the variables in the full sample with those of unconstrained men, we see that the differences between the subgroups tend to average out, with the exception that that weekly non-labour income is still about 10% higher for unconstrained individuals. The wage variable was derived as the net marginal overtime wage assuming an overtime premium of time-and-a-half (the actual premium applying to each individual cannot be determined from the data) and the marginal income tax rate calculated for each worker (from the UK Inland
Revenue income tax bands and allowances over the period, given his wage income and marital status).
9 Table 2 gives some idea of how reported constraints varied for individuals over the panel. The first two columns of figures repeat the overall summary statistics given in Table 1 . The next two columns show the number of individuals who ever reported each of the constraint states, so that, for example, 303 (or 17.8% of ) individuals reported being underemployed at some time during the observed time period, and over half of men said they were overemployed at least once. These figures are substantially larger than the overall statistics, and indicate that individuals do move between constraint states. The final column shows, for individuals observed at least twice, the percentage of time spent in each state conditional on experiencing that state at least once. For example, men who were ever underemployed reported underemployment at 39% of waves on average. The highest figure is for workers who were ever unconstrained: they said they were happy with their hours in 67% of waves on average. Again these statistics suggest a large degree of 'churning'.
[ Table 2 around here]
In order to facilitate comparisons with Stewart and Swaffield (1997) , I used the same functional form of the desired hours equation (1), i.e.:
h it S = x it β + δ 1 lnw it + δ 2 y it /w it + η 1i + ε 1it (10) where w it is the net marginal wage, y it is non-labour income, x it is a vector of variables influencing desired hours, and β, δ 1 and δ 2 are coefficients to be estimated. This form 9 The wage formula is: net wage = 1. included in z it but excluded from x 1it , were not, in fact, incorrectly excluded from x 1it .
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On this basis I rejected from the selection equation dummy variables for firm size, pay including regular increments, and evening and night work. Table 3 reports the estimates of the selection model. They show that the probability of overemployment, rather than underemployment, rose with increasing age until about 45 years and then fell off. Several variables had a statistically significant effect, for example those receiving bonus payments were more likely to be overemployed, as were married men. Longer tenure raised the probability of overemployment. In addition to the distributional assumption, the exclusion of tenure from the desired hours equation acts as an identifying restriction. The coefficients on lnw i and y i /w i imply that higher wages reduced the probability of overemployment at the sample means of wage and non-labour income. The fact that several of the 10 This involved regressing the residuals from the selection-corrected desired hours equation on all the exogenous variables and then calculating the test statistic NR 2 where N is the unconstrained sample size and the R 2 is from this supplementary regression. The statistic was then compared to the appropriate critical value from the χ 2 (k -1) distribution, where k is the number of excluded variables. The test controls to be included in the desired hours equation had statistically significant effects in the selection model is evidence that the difference between desired and actual hours is influenced by supply characteristics. As noted above, this difference is an omitted variable in a supply equation estimated on the full sample of workers under the alternative hypothesis of distinct hours regimes. The correlation between this omitted variable and the supply characteristics x 1it will bias estimates of the coefficients β. The estimate of ρ is significantly different from zero, consistent with the presence of an permanent effect and justifying use of the panel correction procedure.
[ Table 3 around here] Table 4 presents summary statistics for the calculated correction terms. The permanent-effect correction term is denoted a 1 (derived from (6)) and the transitory effect term (derived from (7)) is denoted a 2 . The top panel of the table shows the means of a 1 (over all 1700 individuals in the full sample) and a 2 (over all 5241 observations in the full sample). By construction, these expectations conditional on all selection outcomes d i should sum to zero over the full sample. The means of a 1 and a 2 are very close to zero, providing a positive check on the calculation procedure. The error is presumably due to rounding. The standard deviation of a 2 is decomposed into that part due to within individual variation and that part due to between individual variation. The former is larger.
[ Table 4 around here] The bottom panel of Table 4 reports the means over the unconstrained sample only. Both means are negative, indicating that unconstrained individuals tend to have unobservable characteristics making them less likely in general to be overemployed (the permanent effect), as well as less likely than usual to be overemployed in a particular period (the transitory effect). The between and within standard deviations for a 2 show that conditional on being unconstrained, there is relatively little variation within individuals in the transitory effect, unlike in the full sample. This lends support to the view that applying a fixed effects estimator to this sub sample without any assumes that the model is identified by the non-linearity of the joint error distribution, so that the variable exclusions over-identify the model. further correction may not result in excessive bias (a 1 and to a large extent a 2 are swept out when deviations are taken from individual means). Table 5 shows estimates of the hours equations. They could have been estimated using generalised least squares (GLS). However, I present OLS estimates for better comparison with the OLS results in the next section. There I argue that the wage is endogenous and propose to instrument it by its lagged value. However, since the instrument is only weakly and not strictly endogenous (it is still correlated with the lagged error), the assumptions underlying GLS (as well as the fixed effects estimator) are violated, which would lead to biased estimates. OLS, in the other hand, is consistent. The coefficients of equation (10) Columns (3) and (4) show OLS estimates with the two correction terms included in the set of regressors. The estimates suggest that the correlation between the transitory effects σ 1εν plays a bigger role than that between the permanent effects σ 1ηα . In both cases individuals who are more likely than expected, given their observable characteristics, to be overemployed tend to desire fewer hours than one would expect. Under the null hypothesis of no selection into the unconstrained sample, the standard errors in column (4) are consistent, and therefore a test of the null can be based on a t-test of each individual coefficient and an F-test of their joint significance. The coefficient on the transitory term a 2 is significant at the 5% level whilst that on the individual term is only significant at the 10% level. However, a joint test yields an F statistic of 8.0, more than twice as large as the 5% critical value F(2,1276)=3.0, leading to a rejection of the null hypothesis of no selectivity into the unconstrained regime.
[ Table 5 around here] Under the alternative hypothesis that selection is relevant, the standard errors of the desired hours equation coefficients are no longer consistent. The covariance matrix may be adjusted using a formula which takes account of the heteroscedasticity and additional sampling error introduced into the hours equation by the use of predictions of γ and σ α to construct a 1 and a 2 , rather than their true values. An alternative procedure is to calculate an estimated covariance matrix using the bootstrap method. Bootstrapping the first stage (as well as the second) will generate variation in the predictions of a 1 and a 2 due to sampling variation of the z it vectors. In general bootstrapping over both stages gives larger standard errors than bootstrapping over just the second stage and is pursued as a conservative strategy. Because there are multiple observations on individuals, the bootstrapping procedure draws individuals (clusters of individual observations) rather than single observations. Again this tends to increase the standard errors. The standard errors are reported in column (5) and do not differ very much from their counterparts in column (4).
The estimates in column (3) are consistent under both the null hypothesis that hours determination in the unconstrained sample does not differ from the other regimes as well as under the alternative hypothesis that hours determination does differ. Column (6) reports estimates derived using the full sample, which are efficient under the null but inconsistent under the alternative. They show a very strong inverted U shaped age profile and a more negative wage coefficient than the estimates in column (3). The Hausman statistic, on which the test for systematic differences between the two sets of coefficients is based, is:
where b c is a k x 1 vector of estimates which are consistent under both the null and alternative, and b e is a k x 1 vector of estimates which are efficient under the null and inconsistent under the alternative. Under the null, this Wald statistic is distributed as χ 2 (k).
Column (8) shows the differences b c -b e and column (9) shows the square root of the difference between their estimated variances. The ratio of each pair of statistics from columns (8) and (9) and wage coefficients appear to differ significantly between the two equations. These differences are qualitatively similar to those reported by Stewart and Swaffield (1997) between their simple OLS and two-limit Tobit estimates. The joint Hausman statistic calculated from (19) was 27.9. This is distributed as χ 2 (7) under the null, which implies a p-value of 0.001.
Both the individual and joint test statistics therefore indicate that the hours regime for manual men who report being unconstrained does differ from that for overemployed and underemployed men. This result has two implications. First, it lends credence to these subjective reports. Second, since the wage coefficient appears to differ significantly when proper account is taken of constraints, it raises questions about how much bias is introduced into estimates of labour supply elasticity if constraints are ignored. This issue is explored in Section 8.
Measurement error
In the results presented thus far the issue of the potential endogeneity of the wage rate was ignored. The wage may be endogenous in the desired hours equation for two reasons: first, unobservable characteristics which raise wages may also be associated with the unobserved characteristics of individuals who wish to work longer hours. Second, any measurement error in hours will induce a spurious negative correlation between the calculated hourly wage and the unobserved term in the hours equation, the so-called division bias problem (Borjas, 1980) . The first problem is traditionally addressed by using instruments such as education to predict wage levels or growth (in differenced hours equations). However, a review of the literature suggests that these instruments are often questionable either because it is not clear that wage measure. No attempt is therefore made here to correct for this source of endogeneity.
The second source is potentially more important (see the studies by Altonji, 1986 and Borjas, 1980) and more soluble with panel data. To guage the size of the problem, a simplified method based on Altonji (1986) is presented which makes use of an additional measure of the wage. It is available in wave 9 onwards and is the response to a direct question asking hourly paid workers for their hourly wage rate.
Let:
w h = w + e h , and
where w h is the reported hourly wage, w e is the measure constructed from usual earnings and usual hours, w is the unobserved true hourly wage, and e h and e e are random errors uncorrelated with each other and w. The error e h might be due to poor recall, whilst e e is assumed to be mainly due to measurement error in hours. The assumption that the errors are additive and independent is probably quite strong, but does enable a simple evaluation of the size of the measurement error problem. Taking (co)variances:
var(w e ) = var(w) + var(e e ), and cov(w h , w e ) = var(w) since cov(e h , e e ) = cov(w, e e ) = cov(w, e h ) = 0 by assumption.
The covariance matrix for a sample of hourly paid manual workers from wave 9 is:
w h w e w h 2.71 w e 2.32 3.73
These figures imply that var(e h ) = 2.71-2.32 = 0.39, which is 14% of var(w h ), whereas var(e e ) = 3.73-2.31 = 1.42, which is 38% of var(w e ). In other words nearly 40% of the variation in the calculated hourly wage appears to be noise, implying extensive misreporting of hours worked. Whilst this measurement error will not bias the estimates of a regression in which hours appear on the left-hand side only, the use of hours to derive the wage (a right-hand side variable) will probably give rise to a strong correlation between this calculated wage and the error term. Assuming that this result holds for the waves 1-9 data used in the estimated model, the coefficient estimates may be subject to substantial bias.
Instrumenting the wage
The panel nature of the data suggests an instrument for the calculated hourly wage: assuming that measurement error is serially uncorrelated, then last year's wage measure should be highly correlated with this year's true wage but uncorrelated with this year's measurement error. Similarly the y i /w i term can also be instrumented by its lagged value. To implement this method a reduced form selection equation, excluding the two endogenous terms (lnw i and y i /w i ), was estimated (results in Table 6 ). The number of observations was reduced since individuals had to be present in the preceding wave so that lagged observations were available.
[ Table 6 around here]
After calculating a 1 and a 2 , the two endogenous variables lnw i and y i /w i were separately regressed on all the exogenous variables of the model, including their own lagged values (the instruments) and a 1 and a 2 , and predictions generated for inclusion in the second stage hours equation. The estimated coefficients from these two regressions are reported in Table A1 of Appendix A. This procedure is as used by Ham (1982) . The regressions were included in the bootstrap routine with the selection equation, in order that the resulting standard errors took account of the use of predicted values. Table 7 presents the hours equations estimates using predictions of lnw i and
[ Table 7 around here]
Though not strictly comparable with the previous results because of the reduced sample size, columns (1) and (2) indicate that endogenising the wage removes the inverted U shaped age profile and reduces the magnitude of the wage coefficient, though not greatly affecting the coefficient on y i /w i . In columns (3) and (4), the correction terms are jointly significant (F = 6.0, p-value = 0.003) and individually significant, so the selection result is not affected by endogenising the wage. The results derived from the full sample and shown in columns (6) and (7) do exhibit the inverted U age profile but the point estimates are only about half the size of those in the uninstrumented equations. The wage coefficient is also substantially smaller in magnitude (-6.7 compared to -9.4 in Table 5 ). The individual Hausman statistics indicate the familiar pattern of significantly different coefficients. The joint test statistic is χ 2 (7) = 20.35.
As noted in Section 3.2, this correction method is based on the assumption that the errors in the selection and hours equations are joint normal. Following Vella and Verbeek (1999) , one can relax the normality assumption in the hours equation by specifying simply that its error components η i and e it are related linearly to the selection equation errors. Equations (6) and (7) can thus be simplified to:
where τ 1 and τ 2 are parameters. Table 8 presents the results derived under this relaxed assumption. The estimates in columns (3)- (5) are very close to their counterparts in Table 7 , except for the coefficients on the correction terms, which are estimates of τ 1 and τ 2 , and naturally reflect the different assumed error correlation structure. Both individual and joint Hausman statistics imply a strong rejection of the hypothesis that constrained and unconstrained men are in the same hours regime, so reinforcing the preceding conclusions.
[ Table 8 around here]
Demand-side variables and constrained workers
The results in the preceding sections indicate that the hours determination of unconstrained workers does differ from that of constrained workers. One implication, leading to an additional check on the results, is that demand-side variables should help to explain the hours of the latter group, but not those of the former. I therefore investigated the effect of the measure of local labour market conditions, the travel-towork area U/V ratio. Table 9 reports the coefficients of hours equations which include the U/V ratio as an extra regressor, estimated over the sub-samples of unconstrained, underemployed and overemployed men. A note of caution is in order with regard to the estimates derived from the two sub-samples of constrained individuals. Since one cannot a priori exclude any demand variables from these equations, the estimates may be biased by omitted variables and identification may in general be weak.
Column (1) shows the estimates based on the unconstrained sample. The coefficient on U/V ratio is insignificant, which is not surprising since the tests of overidentifying restrictions had already indicated that it did not belong in the desired hours equation. The estimates for underemployed men are reported in column (2). The coefficient on U/V ratio is statistically significant (t = 2.51) and more than eight times that in column (1). The sample standard deviation of the U/V ratio is 10.7, so an increase of one standard deviation would increase expected hours by nearly 1.5 hours.
By contrast, the coefficient on U/V ratio in the equation for overemployed men (column (3)) is negative, though still statistically significant (t = 3.9) and economically large: a one standard deviation increase in the U/V ratio would reduce expected hours by just over an hour. Notwithstanding the caveat above about the possible fragility of these estimates, they suggest that the hours of constrained individuals are influenced by the local labour market, and in different ways for the two constrained groups. Underemployed men work longer hours when labour market conditions are less favourable, possibly reflecting precautionary motives and fear of unemployment (recall that constrained hours will be determined by a combination of supply and demand factors). On the other hand overemployed men work fewer hours:
their hours seem to reflect local labour demand directly. It may be noted in passing, that this effect is at variance with the monopsony explanation of overemployment:
hours increase in a tight labour market, holding the wage fixed.
[ Table 9 around here]
Labour supply elasticities
The functional form of the hours equation implies the following expressions for the wage and income elasticities:
where ε wu (ε wc ) is the uncompensated (compensated) wage elasticity and ε y is the income elasticity. Table 10 shows the calculated elasticities (evaluated at the sample means of the wage, hours and non-labour income) from the full sample without correction and from the unconstrained sample with selectivity-correction, when the wage is assumed exogenous and endogenous.
[ Table 10 around here]
Whether or not the wage is assumed exogenous, estimation on the full sample of workers (assumed unconstrained) tends to exaggerate the responsiveness of hours to wages (by 20-40% for the uncompensated elasticity) and non-labour income (by 40-60%). The results suggest that the hours of constrained individuals increase more than they would like when their wages or non-labour income fall. Ignoring measurement error in the wage also seems to impart a large downward bias of about 40-60%. The preferred estimates in the final column imply a labour supply function which nevertheless bends backwards with elasticity 0.1. The compensated (substitution) elasticity is positive as predicted by theory with value 0.1. The combination of bias in the uncompensated elasticity estimates due to the assumptions that all workers are unconstrained and that the wage is exogenous is nearly 100%.
Conclusions
If workers' reported dissatisfaction with working hours reflects actual restrictions on their choice of hours, then unconstrained workers' hours should be determined differently from those of their unconstrained colleagues. Using a general selection model I have found evidence in support of this prediction for male manual workers, lending credence to their subjective reports of constraints. This evidence corroborates other work done on the BHPS by Stewart and Swaffield (1997) , who used a cross-sectional sample and a more specific model, and Böheim and Taylor (2001) , who found that adjustments in working hours were related to previous constraints.
The results suggest that policy concern over hours and 'work-life balance' may be justified, since many individuals appear unable to attain their utility maximising (3) * significant at 10% confidence level; ** significant at 5% confidence level; *** significant at 1% confidence level (4) The coefficient ρ is defined as ρ ≡ σ α 2 / (σ ν 2 + σ α 2 ) = σ α 2 / (1 + σ α 2 ) 
B/S SE (7) 
